Probable Innocence Revisited by Chatzikokolakis, Konstantinos & Palamidessi, Catuscia
Probable Innocence Revisited
Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi
To cite this version:
Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi. Probable Innocence Revisited. Theodosis
Dimitrakos and Fabio Martinelli and Peter Y. A. Ryan and Steve A. Schneider. Third Interna-
tional Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2005), Jul 2005, Newcastle
Upon Tyne, United Kingdom. Springer, 3866, pp.142-157, 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science; Third International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, Revised Se-
lected Papers. <inria-00201109>
HAL Id: inria-00201109
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00201109
Submitted on 23 Dec 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Probable Innocence Revisited ?
Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis a, Catuscia Palamidessi a
a INRIA Futurs and LIX, ´Ecole Polytechnique
Abstract
In this paper we propose a formalization of probable innocence, a notion of probabilistic
anonymity that is associated to “realistic” protocols such as Crowds. We analyze critically
two different definitions of probable innocence from the literature. The first one, corre-
sponding to the property that Reiter and Rubin have proved for Crowds, aims at limiting
the probability of detection. The second one, by Halpern and O’Neill, aims at constraining
the attacker’s confidence. Our proposal combines the spirit of both these definitions while
generalizing them. In particular, our definition does not need symmetry assumptions, and
it does not depend on the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest. We
show that, in case of a symmetric system, our definition corresponds exactly to the one of
Reiter and Rubin. Furthermore, in the case of users with uniform probabilities, it amounts
to a property similar to that of Halpern and O’Neill.
Another contribution of our paper is the study of probable innocence in the case of pro-
tocol composition, namely when multiple runs of the same protocol can be linked, as in the
case of Crowds.
1 Introduction
Often we wish to ensure that the identity of the user performing a certain action
is maintained secret. This property is called anonymity. Examples of situations in
which we may wish to provide anonymity include: publishing on the web, retriev-
ing information from the web, sending a message, etc. Many protocols have been
designed for this purpose, for example, Crowds [15], Onion Routing [23], the Free
Haven [7], Web MIX [1] and Freenet [4].
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Most of the protocols providing anonymity use random mechanisms. Consequently,
it is natural to think of anonymity in probabilistic terms. Various notions of proba-
bilistic anonymity have been proposed in literature, at different levels of strength.
The notion of anonymity in [3], called conditional anonymity in [9,10], and inves-
tigated also in [2], describes the ideal situation in which the protocol does not leak
any information concerning the identity of the user. This property is satisfied for
instance by the Dining Cryptographers with fair coins [3]. Protocols used in prac-
tice, however, especially in presence of attackers or corrupted users, are only able
to provide a weaker notion of anonymity.
In [15] Reiter and Rubin have proposed a hierarchy of notions of probabilistic
anonymity in the context of Crowds. We recall that Crowds is a system for anony-
mous web surfing aimed at protecting the identity of the users when sending (orig-
inating) messages. This is achieved by forwarding the message to another user se-
lected randomly, which in turn forwards the message, and so on, until the message
reaches its destination. Part of the users may be corrupted (attackers), and one of
the main purposes of the protocol is to protect the identity of the originator of the
message from those attackers.
Quoting from [15], the hierarchy is described as follows. Here the sender stands
for the user that forwards the message to the attacker.
Beyond suspicion From the attacker’s point of view, the sender appears no more
likely to be the originator of the message than any other potential sender in the
system.
Probable innocence From the attacker’s point of view, the sender appears no more
likely to be the originator of the message than to not be the originator.
Possible innocence From the attacker’s point of view, there is a nontrivial proba-
bility that the real sender is someone else.
In [15] the authors also considered a formal definition of probable innocence tai-
lored to the characteristics of the Crowds system, and proved it to hold for Crowds
under certain conditions. Later Halpern and O’Neill proposed in [10] a formal in-
terpretation of the notions of the hierarchy above in more general terms. Their
definitions are based on the confidence of the attacker. More precisely their defi-
nition of probable innocence holds if for the attacker, given the events that he has
observed, the probability that an user i has performed the action of interst is no
more than 1/2.
However, the property of probable innocence that Reiter and Rubin express for-
mally and prove for the system Crowds in [15] does not mention the user’s proba-
bility of being the originator, but only the probability of the event observed by the
attacker. More precisely, the property proved for Crowds is that the probability that
the originator forwards the message to an attacker (given that an attacker receives
eventually the message) is at most 1/2. In other words, their definition expresses a
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limit on the probability of detection.
The property proved for Crowds in [15] depends only on the way the protocol
works, and on the number of the attackers. It is totally independent from the prob-
ability of each user to be the originator. This is of course a very desirable property,
since we do not want the correctness of a protocol to depend on the users’ intentions
of originating a message. For stronger notions of anonymity, this abstraction from
the users’ probabilities 1 leads to the notion of probabilistic anonymity defined in
[2], which is equivalent to the conditional anonymity defined in [9,10]. Note that
this definition is different from the notion of strong probabilistic anonymity given
in [9,10]: the latter depends, again, on the probabilities of the users to perform the
action of interest.
Another intended feature of our notion of probable innocence is the abstraction
from the specific characteristics of Crowds. In Crowds, there are certain symmetries
that derive from the assumption that the probability that user i forwards the message
to user j is the same for all i and j. The property of probable innocence proved for
Crowds in [15] depends strongly on this assumption. We want a general notion
that has the possibility to hold even in protocols which do not satisfy the Crowds’
symmetries.
For completeness, we also consider the composition of protocols executions, with
specific focus on the case that in which the originator is the same and the protocol to
be executed is the same. This situation can arise, for instance, when an attacker can
induce the originator to repeat the protocol (multiple paths attack). We extend the
definition of probable innocence to the case of protocol composition under the same
originator, and we study how this property depends on the number of compositions.
All the notions developed in this paper are defined by using a model, for protocols
and systems, based on a simplified version of Probabilistic Automata ([18]). Proba-
bilistic Automata, and similar models like the Concurrent Markov Chains, are now
a mature field of research with a solid theory and well established model check-
ing tools like PRISM [13]. This opens the way to the automatic verification of our
notion of probable innocence. We refer to [5] for various examples of verification,
using PRISM, of the related notion of weak anonymity developed within the same
framework of simplified Probabilistic Automata. Furthermore, we are currently de-
veloping a model checker for the probabilistic pi-calculus [11,14]. This is a formal-
ism whose semantics is again based on simplified Probabilistic Automata and it
is a natural langauge for expressing protocols running on distributed systems like
Crowds. We aim in particular at developing efficient model checking techniques
for computing the conditional probablity of events, which constitute the only kind
of quantitaive information needed for proving the formula expressing our notion of
probable innocence.
1 For simplicity sometime we will refer to the users’ probability of performing the action
of interest as “users’ probabilites”
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1.1 Contribution
The main goal of this paper is to establish a general notion of probable innocence
which combines the spirits of the approches discussed above, namely it expresses
a limit both on the attacker’s confidence and on the probability of detection. Fur-
thermore, we aim at a notion that does not depend on symmetry assumptions and
on the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest.
We show that our definition, while being more general, corresponds exactly to the
property that Reiter and Rubin have proved for Crowds, under the specific sym-
metry conditions which are satisfied by Crowds. We also show that in the particu-
lar case that the users have uniform probability of being the originator, we obtain
a property similar to the definition of probable innocence given by Halpern and
O’Neill.
A second contribution is the analysis of the robustness of probable innocence un-
der multiple paths attacks, which induce a repetition of the protocol. We show a
general negative result, namely that no protocol can ensure probable innocence un-
der an arbitrary number of repetitions, unless the system is strongly anonymous.
This generalizes the result, already known in literature, about the fact that Crowds
cannot guarantee probable innocence under unbound multiple path attacks.
1.2 Plan of the paper
In next section we recall some notions which are used in the rest of the paper:
the Probabilistic Automata, the framework for anonymity developed in [2], and the
definition of (strong) probabilistic anonymity given in [2]. In Section 3 we illustrate
the Crowds protocol, we recall the property proved for Crowds and the definition
of probable innocence by Halpern and O’Neill, and we discuss them. In Section
4 we propose our notion of probable innocence and we compare it with those of
Section 3. In Section 5 we consider the repetition of an anonymity protocol and we
show that we cannot guarantee probable innocence for arbitrary repetition unless
the protocol is strongly anonymous. In Section 6 we discuss some related work
from the literature. Section 7 concludes.
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Fig. 1. Examples of probabilistic automata
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Probabilistic Automata
In our approach we consider systems that can perform both probabilistic and nonde-
terministic choice. Intuitively, a probabilistic choice represents a set of alternative
transitions, each of them associated to a certain probability of being selected. The
sum of all probabilities on the alternatives of the choice must be 1, i.e. they form
a probability distribution. Nondeterministic choice is also a set of alternatives, but
we have no information on how likely one alternative is selected.
There have been many models proposed in literature that combine both nondeter-
ministic and probabilistic choice. One of the most general is the formalism of prob-
abilistic automata proposed in [18]. In this work we use this formalism to model
anonymity protocols. We give here a brief description of it.
A probabilistic automaton consists in a set of states, and labeled transitions between
them. For each node, the outgoing transitions are partitioned in groups called steps.
Each step represents a probabilistic choice, while the choice between the steps is
nondeterministic.
Figure 1 illustrates some examples of probabilistic automata. We represent a step
by putting an arc across the member transitions. For instance, in (a), state s1 has
two steps, the first is a probabilistic choice between two transitions with labels a
and b, each with probability 1/2. When there is only a transition in a step, like the
one from state s3 to state s6, the probability is of course 1 and we omit it.
In this paper, we use only a simplified kind of automaton, in which from each node
we have either a probabilistic choice or a nondeterministic choice (more precisely,
either one step or a set of singleton steps), like in (b). In the particular case that the
choices are all probabilistic, like in (c), the automaton is called fully probabilistic.
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Given an automaton M , we denote by etree(M) its unfolding, i.e. the tree of all
possible executions of M (in Figure 1 the automata coincide with their unfolding
because there is no loop). If M is fully probabilistic, then each execution (maximal
branch) of etree(M) has a probability obtained as the product of the probability of
the edges along the branch. In the finite case, we can define a probability measure
for each set of executions, called event, by summing up the probabilities of the
elements 2 . Given an event x, we will denote by p(x) the probability of x. For
instance, let the event c be the set of all computations in which c occurs. In (c) its
probability is p(c) = 1/3× 1/2 + 1/6 = 1/3.
When nondeterminism is present, the probability can vary, depending on how we
resolve the nondeterminism. In other words we need to consider a function ς that,
each time there is a choice between different steps, selects one of them. By pruning
the non-selected steps, we obtain a fully probabilistic execution tree etree(M, ς)
on which we can define the probability as before. For historical reasons (i.e. since
nondeterminism typically arises from the parallel operator), the function ς is called
scheduler.
It should then be clear that the probability of an event is relative to the particular
scheduler. We will denote by pς(x) the probability of the event x under the sched-
uler ς . For example, consider (a). We have two possible schedulers determined by
the choice of the step in s1. Under one scheduler, the probability of c is 1/2. Under
the other, it is 2/3 × 1/2 + 1/3 = 2/3. In (b) we have three possible schedulers
under which the probability of c is 0, 1/2 and 1, respectively.
2.2 Anonymity systems
The concept of anonymity is relative to the set of anonymous users and to what
is visible to the observer. Hence, following [17,16] we classify the actions of the
automaton into the three sets A, B and C as follows:
• A is the set of the anonymous actions A = {a(i) | i ∈ I} where I is the set of the
identities of the anonymous users and a is an injective function from I to the set
of actions, which we call abstract action. We also call the pair (I, a) anonymous
action generator.
• B is the set of the observable actions. We will use b, b′, . . . to denote the elements
of this set.
• C is the set of the remaining actions (which are unobservable).
2 In the infinite case things are more complicated: we cannot define a probability measure
for all sets of execution, and we need to consider as event space the σ-field generated by
the cones of etree(M). However, in this paper, we consider only the finite case.
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Note that the actions in A normally are not visible to the observer, or at least, not
for the part that depends on the identity i. However, for the purpose of defining
and verifying anonymity we model the elements of A as visible outcomes of the
system.
Definition 1 An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a, B,Z , p), where M is a prob-
abilistic automaton, (I, a) is an anonymous action generator, B is a set of observ-
able actions, Z is the set of all possible schedulers for M , and for every ς ∈ Z , pς
is the probability measure on the event space generated by etree(M, ς).
For simplicity, we assume the users to be the only possible source of nondetermin-
ism in the system. If they are probabilistic, then the system is fully probabilistic,
hence Z is a singleton and we omit it.
We introduce the following notation to represent the events of interest:
• a(i) : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the action a(i);
• a : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i;
• o : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the sequence of observable ac-
tions o (where o is of the form b1b2 . . . bn for some b1, b2, . . . , bn ∈ B). We denote
by O (observables) the set of all o’s of interest.
We use the symbols ∪, ∩ and ¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the
complement of events, respectively.
We wish to keep the notion of observables as general as possible, but we still need
to make some assumptions on them. First, we want the observables to be execution-
disjoint events, in the sense that no execution can contain both o1 and o2 if o1 6= o2.
Second, they must cover all possible outcomes. Third, an observable o must indicate
unambiguously whether a has taken place or not, i.e. it either implies a, or it implies
¬a. In set-theoretic terms it means that either o is a subset of a or of the complement
of a. Formally 3 :
Assumption 1 (on the observables)
(1) ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 6= o2 ⇒ pς(o1 ∪ o2) = pς(o1) + pς(o2)
(2) ∀ς ∈ Z . pς(O) = 1
(3) ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. (pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o)) ∨ pς(o ∩ ¬a) = pς(o)
Analogously, we need to make some assumption on the anonymous actions. We
consider first the conditions tailored for the nondeterministic users: each scheduler
3 Note that the intuitive explanations here are stronger than the corresponding formal as-
sumptions because, in the infinite case, there could be non-trivial sets of measure 0. How-
ever in the case of anonymity we usually deal with finite scenarios. In any case, these formal
assumptions are enough for the ensuring the properties of the anonymity notions that we
need in this paper.
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determines completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place or not, and in
the positive case, there is only one such i. Formally:
Assumption 2 (on the anonymous actions, for nondeterministic users)
∀ς ∈ Z . pς(a) = 0 ∨ (∃i ∈ I. (pς(a(i)) = 1 ∧ ∀j ∈ I. j 6= i ⇒ pς(a(j)) = 0))
We now consider the case in which the users are fully probabilistic. The assumption
on the anonymous actions in this case is much weaker: we only require that there
be at most one user that performs a, i.e. a(i) and a(j) must be disjoint for i 6= j.
Formally:
Assumption 3 (on the anonymous actions, for probabilistic users)
∀i, j ∈ I. i 6= j ⇒ p(a(i) ∪ a(j)) = p(a(i)) + p(a(j))
2.3 Strong probabilistic anonymity
In this section we recall the notion of strong anonymity proposed in [2].
Let us first assume that the users are nondeterministic. Intuitively, a system is
strongly anonymous if, given two schedulers ς and ϑ that both choose a (say a(i)
and a(j), respectively), it is not possible to detect from the probabilistic measure
of the observables whether the scheduler has been ς or ϑ (i.e. whether the selected
user was i or j).
Note that ς chooses a if and only if pς(a) = 1 or, equivalently, if and only if
pς(a(i)) = 1 for some i.
Definition 2 A system (M, I, a, B,Z , p) with nondeterministic users is anony-
mous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς(a) = pϑ(a) = 1 ⇒ pς(o) = pϑ(o)
The probabilistic counterpart of Definition 2 can be formalized using the concept
of conditional probability. Recall that, given two events x and y with p(y) > 0, the
conditional probability of x given y, denoted by p(x | y), is equal to p(x ∩ y)/p(y).
Definition 3 A system (M, I, a, B, p) with probabilistic users is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0) ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j))
The notions of anonymity illustrated so far focus on the probability of the observ-
ables. More precisely, it requires the probability of the observables to be indepen-
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dent from the selected user. In [2] it was shown that Definition 3 is equivalent to
the notion adopted implicitly in [3], and called conditional anonymity in [9]. As
illustrated in the introduction, the idea of this notion is that a system is anonymous
if the observations do not change the probability of the a(i)’s. In other words, we
may know the probability of a(i) by some means external to the system, but the
system should not increase our knowledge about it.
Proposition 4 ([2]) A system (M, I, a, B, p) with probabilistic users is anony-
mous iff
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | a)
Note 1 To be precise, the probabilistic counterpart of Definition 2 should be stronger
than that given in Definition 3, in fact it should be independent from the probabil-
ities of the users to perform the action of interest, like Definition 2 is. We could
achieve this by assuming the system to be parametric with respect to the probabil-
ity distribution of the users, and then require the formula to hold for every possible
distribution. Proposition 4 should be modified accordingly.
Note 2 The large number of anonymity definitions often leads to confusion. In the
rest of the paper we will refer to Definition 3 as (strong) probabilistic anonymity. By
conditional anonymity we will refer to the condition in Proposition 4 which corre-
sponds to the definition of Halpern and O’Neill ([9]). Finally by strong anonymity
we will refer to the corresponding definition in [9] which can be expressed as:
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O : p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o) (1)
3 Probable Innocence
Strong and conditional anonymity are notions which are usually difficult to achieve
in practice. For instance, in the case of protocols like Crowds, the originator needs
to take some initiative, thus revealing himself to the attacker with greater probabil-
ity than the rest of the users. As a result, more relaxed levels of anonymity, such as
probable innocence, are provided by real protocols.
Probable innocence is verbally defined by Reiter and Rubin ([15]) as “the sender
(the user who forwards the message to the attacker) appears no more likely to be
the originator than not to be the originator”. Two different approaches to formalize
this notion exist. The first focuses on the probability of the observables and con-
straints the probability of detecting a user. The second focuses on the probability
of the users and constraints the attacker’s confidence that the detected user is the
originator.
In this section we first present the Crowds protocol. Then we discuss the two exist-
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ing definitions in literature, corresponding to the appraoches above, and we argue
that each of them has some shortcoming: the first does not seem satisfatory when
the system is not symmetric. The second depends on the users (their pobability to
perform the action) while, intuitively, anonymity should be a property of the proto-
col only. In Section 4 we will present a new definition which combines the spirit of
the existing ones, and that at the same time overcomes the above shortcomings.
3.1 The Crowds protocol
This protocol, presented in [15], allows Internet users to perform web transactions
without revealing their identity. The idea is to randomly route the request through
a crowd of users. Thus when the web server receives the request he does not know
who is the originator since the user who sent the request to the server is simply for-
warding it. The more interesting case, however, is when an attacker is a member of
the crowd and participates in the protocol. In this case the originator is exposed with
higher probability than any other user and strong anonymity cannot be achieved.
However, it can be proved that Crowds provides probable innocence under certain
conditions.
More specifically a crowd is a group of m users who participate in the protocol.
Some of the users may be corrupted which means they can collaborate in order
to reveal the identity of the originator. Let c be the number of such users and pf
a parameter of the protocol, explained below. When a user, called the initiator or
originator, wants to request a web page he must create a path between him and the
server. This is achieved by the following process:
• The initiator selects randomly a member of the crowd (possibly himself) and
forwards the request to him. We will refer to this latter user as the forwarder.
• A forwarder, upon receiving a request, flips a biased coin. With probability 1−pf
he delivers the request directly to the server. With probability pf he selects ran-
domly, with uniform probability, a new forwarder (possibly himself) and for-
wards the request to him. The new forwarder repeats the same procedure.
The response from the server follows the same route in the opposite direction to
return to the initiator. It must be mentioned that all communication in the path is
encrypted using a path key, mainly to defend against local eavesdroppers (see [15]
for more details). In this paper we are interested in attacks performed by corrupted
members of the crowd to reveal the initiator’s identity. Each member is consid-
ered to have only access to the traffic routed through him, so he cannot intercept
messages addressed to other members.
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3.2 Definition of probable innocence
3.2.1 First approach (limit on the probability of detection):
Reiter and Rubin ([15]) give a definition which considers the probability of the
originator being observed by a corrupted member, that is being directly before him
in the path. Let I denote the event “the originator is observed by a corrupted mem-
ber” and H 1+ the event “at least one corrupted member appears in the path”. Then
probable innocence can be defined as
p(I |H1+) ≤ 1/2 (2)
In [15] it is proved that this property is satisfied by Crowds if n ≥ pf
pf−1/2
(c + 1).
For simplicity, we suppose that a corrupted user will not forward a request to other
crowd members, so at most one user can be observed. This approach is also fol-
lowed in [15,21,24] and the reason is that by forwarding the request the corrupted
users cannot gain any new information since forwarders are chosen randomly.
We now express the above definition in the framework of this paper (Section 2.2).
Since I ⇒ H1+ we have p(I |H1+) = p(I)/p(H1+). If Ai denotes that “user i is
the originator” and D i is the event “the user i was observed by a corrupted member
(appears in the path right before the corrupter member)” then p(I) = ∑i p(Di ∧
Ai) =
∑
i p(Di |Ai)p(Ai). Since p(Di |Ai) is the same for all i then the definition
(2) can be written ∀i : p(Di |Ai)/P (H1+) ≤ 1/2.
Let A be the set of all crowd members and O = {oi | i ∈ A} the set of observables.
Essentially a(i) denotes Ai and oi denotes Di. Note that Di is an observable since
it can be observed by a corrupted user (remember that corrupted users share their
information). Also let h = ∨i∈A oi, meaning that some user was observed. The
definition (2) can now be written:
∀i ∈ A : p(oi | a(i)) ≤ 1
2
p(h) (3)
This is indeed an intuitive definition for Crowds. However there are many questions
raised by this approach. For example, we are only interested in the probability of
one specific event, what about other events that might reveal the identity of the
initiator? For example the event ¬oi will have probability greater than p(h)/2, is
this important? Moreover, consider the case where the probability of oi under a
different initiator j is negligible. Then, if we observe oi, isn’t it more probable that
user i sent the message, even if p(oi | a(i)) is less than p(h)/2?
If we consider arbitrary protocols, then there are cases where the condition (3) does
not express the expected properties of probable innocence. We give two examples
of such systems in Figure 2 and we explain them below.
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o1 o2 · · · om
a(1) c
m−pf
l · · · l
a(2) 0
.
.
.
.
.
. m-1 Crowd
a(m) 0
o1 o2 o3
a(1) 2/3 1/6 1/6
a(2) 2/3 1/6 1/6
a(3) 2/3 1/6 1/6
Fig. 2. Examples of arbitrary (non symmetric) protocols. The value at position i, j repre-
sents p(oj | a(i)) for user i and observable oj .
Example 5 On the left-hand side of Figure 2, m users are participating in a Crowds-
like protocol. The only difference, with respect to the standard Crowds, is that user
1 is behind a firewall, which means that he can send messages to any other user
but he cannot receive messages from any of them. In the corresponding table we
give the conditional probabilities p(oj | a(i)), where we recall that oj means that j
is the user who sends the message to the corrupted member, and a(i) means that i
is the initiator. When user 1 is the initiator the probability of observing him is c
m−pf
(there is a c/m chance that user 1 sends the message to a corrupted user and there
is also a chance that he forwards it to himself and sends it to a corrupted user in the
next round). All other users can be observed with the same probability l. When any
other user is the initiator, however, the probability of observing user 1 is 0, since
he will never receive the message. In fact, the protocol will behave exactly like a
Crowd of m− 1 users as it is shown in the table.
Note that Reiter and Rubin’s definition (3) requires the diagonal of this table to
be less than p(h)/2. In this example the definition holds provided that m − 1 ≥
pf
pf−1/2
(c + 1). In fact, for all users i 6= 1, p(oi | a(i)) is the same as in the original
Crowds (which satisfies the definition) and for user 1 it is even smaller. However, If
a corrupted member observes user 1 he can be sure that he is the initiator since no
other initiator leads to the observation of user 1. The problem here is that Reiter
and Rubin’s definition constraints only the probability of detection of user 1 and
says nothing about the attacker’s confidence in case of detection. We believe that
totally revealing the identity of the initiator with non-negligible probability is un-
desirable and should be considered as a violation of an anonymity notion such as
probable innocence.
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Example 6 On the right-hand side we have an opposite counter-example. Three
users want to communicate with a web server, but they can only access it through a
proxy. We suppose that all users are honest but they do not trust the proxy so they
do not want to reveal their identity to him. So they use the following protocol: the
initiator first forwards the message to one of the users 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities
2/3, 1/6 and 1/6 respectively, regardless of which is the initiator. The user who
receives the message forwards it to the proxy. The probabilities of observing each
user are shown in the corresponding table. Regardless of which is the initiator, user
1 will be observed with probability 2/3 and the others with probability 1/6 each.
In this example Reiter and Rubin’s definition does not hold since p(o1 | a(1)) > 1/2.
However all users produce the same observables with the same probabilities hence
we cannot distinguish between them. Indeed the system is strongly anonymous (Def-
inition 3 holds)! Thus, in the general case, we cannot adopt (3) as the definition of
probable innocence since we want such a notion to be implied by strong anonymity.
However, it should be noted that in the case of Crowds the definition of Reiter and
Rubin is correct, because of a special symmetry property of the protocol. This is
discussed in detail in Section 4.1.
Finally, note that the above definition does not mention the probability of the users
to be the originator. It only considers such events as conditions in the conditional
probability of the event oi given that i is the originator. The value of such condi-
tional probability does not imply anything for the user, he might have a very small
or very big probability of initiating the message. This is a major difference with
respect to the next approach.
3.2.2 Second approach (limit on the attacker’s confidence):
Halpern and O’Neill propose in [9] a general framework for defining anonymity
properties. We give a very abstract idea of this framework, detailed information
is available in [9]. In this framework a system consists of a group of agents, each
having a local state at each point of the execution. The local state contains all infor-
mation that the user may have and does not need to be explicitly defined. At each
point (r, m) user i can only have access to his local state ri(m). So he does not
know the actual point (r, m) but at least he knows that it must be a point (r ′, m′)
such that r′i(m′) = ri(m). Let Ki(r, m) be the set of all these points. If a formula
φ is true in all points of Ki(r, m) then we say that i knows φ. In the probabilistic
setting it is possible to create a measure on Ki(r, m) and draw conclusions of the
form “formula φ is true with probability p”.
To define probable innocence Halpern and O’Neill first define a formula θ(i, a)
meaning “user i performed the event a”. We then say that a system has probable
innocence if for all points (r, m), the probability of θ(i, a) in this point for all users
j (that is, the probability that arises by measuring Kj(r, m)) is less that one half.
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This definition can be expressed in the framework of Section 2.2. The probability
of a formula φ for user j at the point (r, m) depends only on the set Kj(r, m) which
itself depends only on rj(m). The latter is the local state of the user, that is the only
things that he can observe. In our framework this corresponds to the observables
of the probabilistic automaton. Thus, we can reformulate the definition of Halpern
and O’Neill as:
∀i ∈ I, ∀o ∈ O : p(a(i) | o) ≤ 1/2 (4)
This definition is similar to the one of Reiter and Rubin but not the same. The
difference is that it considers the probability that, given a certain observation, the
user has performed the action of interest, not the opposite. If this probability is less
that one half then intuitively i appear less likely to have performed o than not to.
The problem with this definition is that the probabilities of the users are not part
of the system and we can make no assumptions about them. Consider for example
the case where we know that user i visits very often a specific web site, so even
if we have 100 users, the probability that he performed a request to this site is
0.99. Then we cannot expect this probability to become less than one half under
all observations. A similar remark about strong anonymity led Halpern and O’Neill
to define conditional anonymity. If a user i has higher probability of performing
the action than user j then we cannot expect this to change because of the system.
Instead we can request that the system does not provide any new information about
the originator of the action.
4 A new definition of probable innocence
In this section we give a new definition of probable innocence that combines the
spirit of the two existing ones. The spirit of Reiter and Rubin’s definition is to con-
straint the probability of detection of a user, which is captured in our Definition
8. The spirit of Halpern and O’Neill’s definition is to constrain the attacker’s con-
fidence, which is captured in our Definition 7. The new definition combines both
spirits in the sense that Definitions 7 and 8 are equivalent. Moreover it overcomes
the shortcomings discussed in previous section, namely, it does not depend on the
symmetry of the system and it does not depend on the users’ probabilities. We also
show that our definition is a generalization of the existing ones since it can be re-
duced to them under the assumption of symmetry for the first, and of uniform users’
probability for the second.
One of the goals of the new definition is to abstract from the probabilities of the
users to perform the action of interest. These probabilities, although they affect the
probability measure p of the anonymity system, are not part of the protocol and
can vary in different executions. To model this fact, let u be a probability measure
on the set I of anonymous users. Then, we suppose that the anonymity system is
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equipped with a probability measure pu, which depends on u, satisfying the follow-
ing conditions:
pu(a(i)) =u(i) (5)
pu(o | a(i))= pu′(o | a(i)) (6)
for all users i, observables o and user distributions u, u′ such that u(i) > 0, u′(i) >
0. Condition (5) requires that the selection of user is made using the distribution u.
Condition (6) requires that, having selected a user, the distribution u does not affect
the probability of any observable o. In other words u is used to select a user and only
for that. This is typical in anonymity protocols where a user is selected in the begin-
ning (this models the user’s decision to send a message) and then some observables
are produced that depend on the selected user. We will denote by p(o | a(i)) the
probability pu(o | a(i)) under some u such that u(i) > 0.
In general we would like our anonymity definitions to range over all possible values
of u since we cannot assume anything about the probabilities of the users to perform
the action of interest. Thus, Halpern and O’Neill’s definition (4) should be written:
∀u∀i∀o : pu(a(i) | o) ≤ 1/2 which makes even more clear the fact that it cannot
hold for all u, for example if we take u(i) to be very close to 1. On the other hand,
Reiter and Rubin’s definition contains only probabilities of the form p(o | a(i)).
Crowds satisfies condition (6) so these probabilities are independent from u.
In [9], where they define conditional anonymity, Halpern and O’Neill make the
following remark about strong anonymity. Since the probabilities of the users to
perform the action of interest are generally unknown we cannot expect that all
users appear with the same probability. All that we can ensure is that the system
does not reveal any information, that is that the probability of every user before
and after making an observation should be the same. In other words, the fraction
between the probabilities of any couple of users should not be one, but should at
least remain the same before and after the observation.
We apply the same idea to probable innocence. We start by rewriting relation (4) as
∀i ∈ A, ∀o ∈ O : 1 ≥ pu(a(i) | o)
pu(
∨
j 6=i a(j) | o)
(7)
As we already explained, if u(i) is very high then we cannot expect this fraction to
be less than 1. Instead, we could require that it does not surpass the corresponding
fraction of the probabilities before the execution of the protocol. So we generalize
condition (7) in the following definition.
Definition 7 A system (M, I, a, B, pu) has probable innocence if for all user dis-
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tributions u, users i ∈ I and observables o ∈ O, the following holds:
(n− 1) pu(a(i))
pu(
∨
j 6=i a(j))
≥ pu(a(i) | o)
pu(
∨
j 6=i a(j) | o)
where n = |I| is the number of anonymous users.
In probable innocence we consider the probability of a user to perform the action
of interst compared to the probability of all the other users together. Definition 7
requires that the fraction of these probabilities after the execution of the protocol
should be no bigger than n − 1 times the same fraction before the execution. The
n−1 factor comes from the fact that in probable innocence some information about
the sender’s identity is leaked. For example, if users are uniformly distributed, each
of them has probability 1/n before the protocol and the sender could appear with
probability 1/2 afterwards. In this case, the fraction between the sender and all
other users is 1
n−1
before the protocol and becomes 1 after. Definition 7 states that
this fraction can be increased, thus leaking some information, but no more than
n− 1 times.
Definition 7 generalizes relation (4) and can be applied in cases where the distribu-
tion of users is not uniform. However it still involves the probabilities of the users
to perform the action of interest, which are not a part of the system. What we would
like is a definition similar to Def. 3 which involves only probabilities of events that
are part of the system. To achieve this we rewrite Definition 7 using the following
transformations. For all users we assume that u(i) > 0. Users with zero probability
to perform the action could be removed from Definition 7 before proceeding.
(n− 1) pu(a(i))∑
j 6=i pu(a(j))
≥ pu(a(i) | o)∑
j 6=i pu(a(j) | o)
⇔
(n− 1) pu(a(i))∑
j 6=i pu(a(j))
≥
pu(o |a(i))pu(a(i))
pu(o)∑
j 6=i
pu(o | a(j))pu(a(j))
pu(o)
⇔
(n− 1)∑
j 6=i
pu(o | a(j))pu(a(j))≥ pu(o | a(i))
∑
j 6=i
pu(a(j))
We obtain a lower bound of the left clause by replacing all pu(o | a(j)) with their
minimum. So we require that
(n− 1) min
j 6=i
{pu(o | a(j))}
∑
j 6=i
pu(a(j))≥ pu(o | a(i))
∑
j 6=i
pu(a(j)) ⇔ (8)
(n− 1) min
j 6=i
pu(o | a(j))≥ pu(o | a(i)) (9)
Condition (9) can be interpreted as follows: for each observable, the probability that
user i performs the action should be balanced by the corresponding probabilities of
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the other users. It would be more natural to have the sum of all pu(o | a(j)) at the
left side, in fact the left side of (9) is a lower bound of this sum. However, since the
probabilities of the users are unknown, we have to consider the “worst” case where
the user with the minimum pu(o | a(j)) has the greatest probability of appearing.
Finally, condition (9) is equivalent to the following definition that we propose as a
general definition of probable innocence.
Definition 8 A system (M, I, a, B, pu) has probable innocence if for all observ-
ables o ∈ O and for all users i, j ∈ I: 4
(n− 1)p(o | a(j)) ≥ p(o | a(i))
The meaning of this definition is that in order for pu(a(i))/pu(
∨
j 6=i a(j)) to increase
at most by n−1 times (Def. 7), the corresponding fraction between the probabilities
of the observables must be at most n−1. Note that in probabilistic anonymity (Def.
3) p(o | a(i)) and p(o | a(j)) are required to be equal. In probable innocence we
allow p(o | a(i)) to be bigger, thus losing some anonymity, but no more than n− 1
times.
Definition 8 has the advantage of including only the probabilities of the observables
and not those of the users, similarly to the Definition 3 of probabilistic anonymity.
It is clear that Definition 8 implies Definition 7 since we strengthened the first
to obtain the second. Since Definition 7 considers all possible distributions of the
users, the inverse implication also holds.
Proposition 9 Definitions 7 and 8 are equivalent.
Proof Def. 8 ⇒ Def. 7 is trivial, since we strengthen the second to obtain the first.
For the inverse suppose that Def. 7 holds but Def. 8 does not, so there exist users
k, l and observable o such that (n − 1)pu(o | a(k)) < pu(o | a(l)). Thus there exist
an  > 0 s.t.
(n− 1)(pu(o | a(k)) + ) ≤ pu(o | a(l)) (10)
Def. 7 should hold for all user distributions u so we select one which assigns a very
small probability δ to all users except k, l. That is u(i) = δ
n−2
∀i 6= k, l. From Def.
7 (for i = k) we have:
4 Remember that pu(o | a(i)) is independent from u so we can take any distribution such
that u(i) > 0, for example a uniform one.
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(n− 1)(pu(a(k))pu(o | a(k)) +∑
j 6=k,l
δpu(o | a(j)))≥ pu(o | a(l))(δ + pu(a(k)) pu(o |a(j))≤1⇒ (11)
(n− 1)(pu(a(k))pu(o | a(k)) + δ)≥ pu(o | a(l))(δ + pu(a(k)) (10)⇒
pu(a(k))pu(o | a(k)) + δ≥ (pu(o | a(k)) + )(δ + pu(a(k)) ⇒
δ(1− pu(o | a(k))− )≥ pu(a(k)) (10)⇒
δ≥ pu(a(k))
1− pu(o | a(l))
n−1
(12)
If n > 2 then the right side of inequality 12 is strictly positive so it is sufficient to
take a smaller δ and end up with a contradiction. If n = 2 then there are no other
users except k, l and we can proceed similarly. 
Example 10 Recall now the two examples of Figure 2. If we apply Definition 8 to
the first one we see that it doesn’t hold since (n − 1)p(o1 | a(2)) = 0  cn−pf =
p(o1 | a(1)). This agree with our intuition of probable innocence being violated
when user 1 is observed. In the second example the definition holds since ∀i, j :
p(oi | a(i)) = p(oj | a(j)). Thus, we see that in these two examples our definition
reflects correctly the notion of probable innocence.
4.1 Relation to other definitions
4.1.1 Definition by Reiter and Rubin
Reiter and Rubin’s definition can be expressed by the condition (3). It considers
the probabilities of the observables (not the users) and it requires that for any user
which originates the message, a special observable, representing the detection of
the user by a corrupted member, has probability less than p(h)/2. As we saw at the
examples of Figure 2 what is important is not the actual probability of an observ-
able when a specific user is the originator, but its relation with the corresponding
probabilities when the other users are the originators.
However in Crowds there are some important symmetries. First of all the number
of the observables is the same as the number of users. For each user i there is an
observable oi meaning that the user i is observed. When i is the initiator, oi has
clearly a higher probability than the other observables. However, since forwarders
are randomly selected, the probability of oj is the same for all j 6= i. The same
holds for the observables. oi is more likely to have been performed by i. However
all other users j 6= i have the same probability of producing it. These symmetries
can be expressed as:
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∀i ∈ I, ∀k, l 6= i : p(ok | a(i)) = p(ol | a(i)) (13)
p(oi | a(k))= p(oi | a(l)) (14)
Because of these symmetries, we cannot have a situation similar to the ones of Fig-
ure 2. On the left-hand side, for example, the probability p(o1 | a(2)) = 0 should
be the same as p(o3 | a(2)). To keep the value 0 (which is the reason why prob-
able innocence is not satisfied) we should have 0 everywhere in the row (except
p(o2 | a(2))) which is impossible since the sum of the row should be p(h) and
p(o2 | a(2)) ≤ p(h)/2.
So the reason why probable innocence is satisfied in Crowds is not the fact that
observing the initiator has low probability (what definition (2) ensures) by itself,
but the fact that definition (2), because of the symmetry, forces the probability of
observing any of the other users to be high enough.
Note that the number of anonymous users n is not the same as the number of users
m in Crowds, in fact n = m− c where c is the number of corrupted users.
Proposition 11 Under the symmetry requirements (13) and (14), Definition 8 is
equivalent to the one of Reiter and Rubin.
Proof Due to the symmetry it is easy to see that there are only two possible values
for p(oi | a(j)). Namely when i is the sender, the probability to observe i is the same
for all i. Similarly the probability of observing a different user j 6= i is the same for
all j. So
p(oi | a(j)) =


φ if i = j
χ if i 6= j
Note that φ + (n− 1)χ = p(h). So Def. 8 for oi becomes
p(oi | a(i))≤ (n− 1)p(oi | a(j)) ⇒
φ≤ (n− 1)χ ⇒
φ≤ p(h)− φ ⇒
p(oi | a(i))≤ 1
2
p(h)
which corresponds to Reiter and Rubin’s definition. .
4.1.2 Definition of Halpern and O’Neill
One of the motivations behind the new definition of probable innocence is that it
should make no assumptions about the probabilities of the users. If we assume a
uniform distribution of users then it can be shown that our definition becomes the
same as the one of Halpern and O’Neill.
19
Strong anonymity (HO) Conditional anon. (HO) Probabilistic anon. (Def. 3)
p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o) uniform⇐⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | a) ⇐⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j))
⇓ ⇓
Probable Inn. (HO) Probable Inn. (Def. 7) Probable Inn. (Def. 8)
1/2 ≥ p(a(i) | o) uniform⇐⇒ (n−1)p(a(i))
p(
∨
a(j))
≥ p(a(i) | o)
p(
∨
a(j) | o)
⇐⇒ (n− 1)p(o | a(j)) ≥ p(o | a(i))
m if symmetric
Probable Inn. (RR)
p(h)/2 ≥ p(oi | a(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probabilities of users Probabilities before and
after the observation
Probabilities of observables
Fig. 3. Relation between the various anonymity definitions
Proposition 12 The definition of Halpern and O’Neill can be obtained by Defini-
tion 7 if we consider a uniform distribution of users, that is a distribution u such
that ∀i, j ∈ I : u(i) = u(j) = 1/n.
Proof Trivial. Since all users have the same probability then ∀i ∈ I : p(a(i)) =
1/n and the left side of definition 7 is equal to 1. 
Note that the equivalence of Def. 7 and Def. 8 is based on the fact that the former
ranges over all possible distributions u. Thus Def. 8 is strictly stronger than the one
of Halpern and O’Neill.
4.1.3 Probabilistic anonymity
It is easy to see that strong anonymity (equation (1)) implies Halpern and O’Neill’s
definition of probable innocence. Definition 8 preserves the same implication in the
case of probabilistic anonymity.
Proposition 13 Probabilistic anonymity implies probable innocence (Definition
8).
Proof Trivial. If Definition 3 holds then p(o | a(j)) = p(o | a(i))∀o, i, j. 
The relation between the various definitions of anonymity is summarized in Fig-
ure 3. The classification in columns is based on the type of probabilities that are
considered. The first column considers the probability of different users, the sec-
ond the probability of the same user before and after an observation and the third
the probability of the observables. Concerning the lines, the first corresponds to the
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strong case and the second to probable innocence. It is clear from the table that
the new definition is to probable innocence as conditional anonymity is to strong
anonymity.
5 Protocol Composition
In protocol analysis, it is often easier to split complex protocols in parts, analyze
each part separetely and then combine the results. In this section we will consider
the case where a protocol is “repeated” multiple times but with only one user-
selection phase in the beginning. This situation arises when an attacker can force a
user to repeat the protocol many times. We will examine the anonymity guarantees
of the resulting protocol with respect to the existing one, obtaining a general result
for a class of attacks that appear in protocols such as Crowds.
First, we define the “sequential composition” of two anonymity systems.
Definition 14 Let A1 = (M1, I, a1, B1, p1), A2 = (M2, I, a2, B2, p2) be two anonymity
systems with the same set of anonymous users I . The sequential composition of A1
and A2, denoted as A1; A2 is an anonymity system (M, I, a, B, p) such that:
exec(M)⊆ exec(M1)× exec(M2) (15)
a−11 (ξ1) = a
−1
2 (ξ2) ∀ξ1ξ2 ∈ exec(M) (16)
p(o1o2 | a(i)) = p1(o1 | a(i)) · p2(o2 | a(i)) ∀o1o2 ∈ O1 ×O2 (17)
where exec(M) is the set of all executions in etree(M), a−1i is the inverse function
of ai and Oi is the set of observables of Ai.
Intuitively, A1; A2 emulates A1 in the beginning. When A1 terminates then it em-
ulates A2 but without re-selecting a user, keeping the same user that was selected
in A1. So the executions of A1; A2 are of the form ξ1ξ2, where ξi is an execution of
Ai, with the constraint that ξ1, ξ2 should correspond to the same user. Since the user
is selected once, the probability of the event o1o2 given a user i is the product of
the corresponding probabilities of each system. We are not interested in the exact
structure of the automaton M , however it should be relatively simple to construct
it from M1 and M2.
Repetion is a special case of sequential composition when the two systems are the
same.
Definition 15 Let A be an anonymity system. We define the m-repetition of A as
Am = A; ...; A, m times.
Let A be an anonymity system and O its set of observables. We will examine the
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anonymity guarantees of Am with respect to the ones of A. From Definition 3 and
equation (17) it is easy to conclude that Am is strongly anonymous if and only if A
is strongly anonymous too, which is expected since the probability of each single
event is the same under any user. However, the case of probable innocence is more
interesting since an event might have greater probability under user i that under
user j.
Consider a system with three users, and one event o with probabilities p(o | a(1))
= 1/2 and p(o | a(2)) = p(o | a(3)) = 1/4. This system satisfies Definition 8 thus
it provides probable innocence. If we repeat the protocol two times then the proba-
bilities for the event oo will be p(oo | a(1)) = 1/4 and p(oo | a(2)) = p(oo | a(3)) =
1/16, but now Definition 8 is violated. In the original protocol the probability of o
under user 1 was two times bigger than the corresponding probability of the other
users, but after the repetition it became 4 times bigger and Definition 8 does not
allow it.
In the general case, the system Am satisfies (by definition) probable innocence if
(n− 1)p(o1 . . . om | a(i)) ≥ p(o1 . . . om | a(j)) ∀o1, . . . , om ∈ O, ∀i, j ∈ I (18)
The following lemma states that it is sufficient to check only the events of the form
o . . . o (the same event repeated m times), and expresses the probable innocence of
Am using probabilities of A.
Lemma 16 Let A = (M, I, a, B, p) be an anonymity system, n = |I| and O its set
of observable events. Am satisfies probable innocence if and only if:
(n− 1)pm(o | a(i)) ≥ pm(o | a(j)) ∀o ∈ O, ∀i, j ∈ I (19)
Proof (only if) We can use equation (18) with o1 = . . . = om = o and then
(17) to obtain (19). (if) We can write (19) as m√n− 1p(o | a(i)) ≥ p(o | a(j)). Let
o1, . . . , om be events, by applying this inequality to all of them we have:
m
√
n− 1p(o1 | a(i))≥ p(o1 | a(j))
.
.
.
m
√
n− 1p(om | a(i))≥ p(om | a(j))
Then by multiplying these inequalities we obtain (18). 
Lemma 16 explains our previous example. The probability p(o | a(2)) = 1/4 was
smaller than p(o | a(1)) = 1/2 but sufficient to provide probable innocence. But
when we raised these probabilities to the power of two, 1/16 was too small so
the event oo whould expose user 1. In fact, if we allow an arbitrary number of
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repetitions equation (19) can never hold, unless the probability of all events under
any user is the same, that is if the system is strongly anonymous.
Proposition 17 Let A be an anonymity system. Am satisfies probable innocence
for all m if and only if A is strongly anonymous.
Proof We rewrite equation (19) as 5 :
n− 1 ≥
(
p(o | a(j))
p(o | a(i))
)m
∀o ∈ O, ∀i, j ∈ I (20)
If A is strongly anonymous then by Definition 3: p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j)) for all
o, i, j so the right side of inequality 20 is 1 thus it always holds (for n ≥ 2). Other-
wise there exist o, i, j such that p(o | a(j)) > p(o | a(i)). So (20) cannot hold for all
m since αm →∞ when m →∞ for α > 1. 
5.1 Multiple paths attack
As stated in the original paper of Crowds, after creating a random path to a server, a
user should use the same path for all the future requests to the same server. However
there is a chance that some node in the path leaves the network, in that case the user
has to create a new path using the same procedure. In theory the two paths cannot
be linked together, that is the attacker cannot know that it is the same user who
created the two paths. In practive, however, such a link could be achieved by means
unrelated to the protocol such as the url of the server, the data of the request etc.
By linking the two requests the attacker obtains more observables that he can use
to track down the originator. Since the attacker also participates in the protocol he
could voluntarily break existing paths that pass through him in order to force the
users to recreate them.
If C is an anonymity system that models Crowds, then the m-paths version cor-
responds to the m-repetition of C, which repeats the protocol m times without
re-selecting a user. From proposition 17 and since Crowds is not strongly anony-
mous, we have that probable innocence cannot be satisfied if we allow an arbitrary
number of paths. Intuitively this is justified. Even if the attacker sees the event o1
meaning that user 1 was detected (was right before a corrupted user in the path) it
could be the case (with non-trivial probability) that user 2 was the real originator,
he sent the message to user 1 and he sent it to the attacker. However, if there are
ten paths and the attacker sees o1 . . . o1 (ten times) then it is much more unprobable
5 Note that in order to have probable innocence (or strong anonymity) p(o | a(i)) should
be non-zero for all o and i except from trivial systems where all observables have zero
probabilities. Thus, we consider only non-zero values for p(o | a(i)).
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that all of the ten times user 2 sent the message to user 1 and user 1 to the attacker.
It appears much more likely that user 1 was indeed the originator.
This attack had been foreseen in the original paper of Crowds and further analysis
was presented in [24,20]. However our result is more general since we prove that
probable innocence is impossible for any protocol that allows “multiple paths”, in
other words that can be modeled as an m-repetition, unless the original protocol is
strongly anonymous. Also our analysis is simpler since we did not need to calculate
the actual probabilities of any observables in a specific protocol.
6 Related Work
Anonymity and privacy have been an area of research for over two decades now,
with an increasing interest on the subject during the last five years, resulting in a
great number of publications. The most related work to ours, as we already dis-
cussed in the introduciton and section 3, is the one of Reiter and Rubin ([15]) and
the one of Halpern and O’Neill ([10]).
Apart from the above two, there are many papers in the anonymity bibliography in
which formal definitions of various notions of anonymity are given. Schneider and
Sidiropoulos ([17]) propose a definition of anonymity based on CSP. Hughes and
Shmatikov ([12]) developed a modular framework to formalize a range of prop-
erties (including numerous flavors of anonymity and privacy) using the notion of
function views to represent a mathematical abstraction of partial knowledge of a
function. Syverson and Stubblebine ([22]) introduce the notion of group princi-
pals and an associated epistemic logic to axiomatize anonymity. In these papers,
possibilistic frameworks are used and it is not clear how the definitions could be
extended in a probabilistic setting.
On the other hand, Bhargava and Palamidessi ([2]) propose a probabilistic defini-
tion of strong anonymity using the same framework as this paper. The resulting
definition can be seen as the strong variant of Definition 8 (in fact, it implies Defi-
nition 8 as shown in section 4.1.3). Serjantov and Danezis ([19]) and Diaz et al ([6])
take an information theoretical approach by considering the entropy of the proaba-
bility distribution that the attacker assigns to the anonymous agents after observing
the system.
Finally, we should mention an interesting work by Evfimievski et al ([8]) on the
field of privacy preserving data mining. Their definition requires that the proba-
bility of a private value x1 producing an output y should be at most γ times the
corresponding probability of a different value x2. This is very close in spirit to our
definition of probable innocence.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered probable innocence, a weak notion of anonymity
provided by real-world systems such as Crowds. We have analyzed the definitions
of probable innocence existing in literature, in particular: the one by Reiter and
Rubin which is suitable for systems which, like Crowds, satisfy certain symmetries,
and the one given by Halpern and O’Neill, which expresses a condition on the
probability of the users.
Our first contribution is a definition of probable innocence which is (intuitively)
adequate for a general class of protocols, abstracts from the probabilities of the
users and involves only the probabilities that depend solely on the system. We have
shown that the new definition is equivalent to the existing ones under symmetry
conditions (Reiter and Rubin) or uniform distribution of the users (Halpern and
O’Neill).
A second contribution is the extension of the definition of probable innocence to
the case of protocol repetition, which is induced by multiple paths attacks. We
have shown a general negative result, namely that no protocol can ensure probable
innocence under an arbitrary number of repetitions.
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